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Racial Differences in Fringe Benefits and Compensation
* 
 
This paper examines differences in two important components of non-wage compensation, 
employer provided health insurance and pensions, across African Americans and the whites 
in the United States. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we study the recent trends in the recipiency of this 
non-wage compensation across race groups. Our results show that African American men on 
average are significantly less likely to receive employer provided health insurance and 
pension than whites in the last decade. We also find that the inclusion of racial differences in 
ability as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score reduces the 
unexplained racial gap in fringe benefit offers, highlighting the importance of human capital 
variables in fringe benefit recipiency. Finally, we re-examine racial inequality in the labor 
market by examining within-group inequality in compensation over the last decade and also 
the role of ability in between-group inequality in compensation. 
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Racial gaps in the labor market have persisted, and in some cases, have even increased recently (for example
see Altonji and Blank[1]). Racial dierences in wages are fairly well documented; however, there is less work
examining the racial dierences in non-wage compensation such as employer-provided health insurance and
pension coverage. This paper seeks to ask several questions: What are the racial dierences in fringe benets
such as health insurance and pension coverage for men and women? What component of the racial dierence
in health insurance and pension coverage can be explained as a result of racial dierences in characteristics?
What are the racial dierences in total compensation, and how do these dier from racial dierences in
wages?
To date, little work examines racial dierences in non-wage compensation. Even and Macpherson[15]
examine gender dierences in pensions and nd that about two-thirds of the gender gap is explained by
dierences in observable worker characteristics. Solberg and Loughlin[38] use NLSY91 to examine gender
inequality by estimating an index of the value of compensation rather than wages only; they nd that
this reduces the overall gender gap, but that the gap remains signicant. They nd racial gaps in total
compensation to be insignicant after controlling for other characteristics. Monheit and Vistnes[30] examine
changes in insurance coverage by race, ethnicity and gender using the 1987 National Medical Expenditure
Survey and the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Study. They nd that for most groups, declines in coverage
between 1987 and 1996 are not explained by changes in observable variables. They also nd that most of
the gap between Hispanic and white men in 1996 is explained by dierences in observable characteristics
such as wages, family income, and education. Dushi and Honig[13] use the 1996 Survey of Income and
Program Participation to examine racial dierences in health insurance coverage and nd that minorities
have signicantly lower rates of insurance coverage than whites. Levy[27] uses the Current Population
Survey to examine racial and gender dierences in health insurance and nds that the inclusion of health
insurance results in a smaller estimate of gender compensation inequality than one that is based solely on
wages. Our work contributes to the literature by further examining racial and gender dierences in oers
of pension coverage as well as health insurance using data from both the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Use of the NLSY allows us further to examine
the role of ability in fringe benet oers; to our knowledge, this is the rst study that examines the role of
ability in racial dierences in fringe benets using NLSY data.
A further important contribution we make is to the literature on compensation inequality. Compen-
sation inequality gives a more relevant concept for understanding well-being than wages alone. There is
recent literature (see for instance work by Pierce[35] and Chung[7]) which nds that the dispersion of total
compensation (measured as the dierence between percentiles of the compensation distribution) exceeds
1the dispersion of wages, and that compensation inequality has grown more in recent years than has wage
inequality.
We nd that white men have signicantly higher oers of health insurance coverage and of pension
coverage than do African American men. Dierences in workplace characteristics favor higher oers of health
insurance and pension coverage for African American men in the CPS, so that controlling for workplace
characteristics such as union membership and rm size increases the racial dierences in fringe benet
recepiency at the extensive margin. For women, we dont nd racial dierences in fringe benets to be
large. However, controlling for racial dierences in ability (using AFQT test scores) in the NLSY data, we
nd that much of the unexplained racial dierence in fringe benet recepiency at the extensive margin for
men disappears. For women, we nd that once we control for racial dierences in ability African American
women are more likely to get fringe benets than white women. This analysis highlights the importance of
racial dierences in human capital measures such as ability in explaining racial dierences in fringe benet
recepiency.
We also use the data on fringe benet oers to estimate total compensation by including the value
of wages, health insurance and pension coverage. Using the CPS data over the last decade, we nd that
non-wage compensation inequality is greater among African Americans than among whites and that the
dispersion in non-wage compensation and compensation is also greater among African Americans than whites
over the last decade. We also use quantile decompositions to examine the role of ability in racial dierences
in compensation. We nd that inclusion of ability in the set of characteristics that are allowed to vary across
groups reduces the unexplained dierence in non-wage compensation (as well as wages and compensation)
between African Americans and whites at all points of the non-wage compensation distribution. Thus, racial
dierences in ability play a role at the intensive as well as extensive margins of non-wage compensation.
In section 2, we begin with a discussion of the empirical facts about fringe benets and the economics
behind these benets. In Section 3, we discuss the datasets used in this study. In Section 4, we consider the
issue of fringe benet take-up and look at the descriptive statistics on fringe benets recipiency by racial
and gender groups. In Section 5, we examine in detail how dierent individual and rm level characteristics
explain the racial dierence in fringe benet recepiency at the extensive margin. In Section 6, we examine
compensation inequality for African Americans and whites over the last decade as well as the role of ability
in racial dierences in compensation. Section 7 discusses a series of caveats and ideas for future research
and Section 8 concludes.
2II. Fringe Benets
IIa. Fringe Benets in the United States
The fraction of employee total compensation attributed to fringe benets has been rising in the last few
decades. Table 1 shows the average employer-cost per hour worked and the amount of which is paid for
fringe benets between 1997 and 2008. The data are published by the Department of Labor, and are based
on civilian employment. In 1997, fringe benets constituted only about 16 percent of the average employee's
total compensation, but this percentage had risen to about 20 percent by 2008. We discuss two of the most
popular fringe benets studied in this paper - employer provided health insurance, and pension plans.
IIa.i. Health Insurance
Table 1 reveals also that employer-provided health insurance has become a rising cost to the employer - in
1997 it constituted 5.9 percent of the hourly average cost, but had risen to 8.4 percent by 2008. Health
insurance is also a signicant part of all fringe benets paid - about 42 percent of fringe benets were due
to health insurance. Health Insurance is often provided by an employer, the employee will normally be
asked to pay a fraction of the total premium cost with the rest of the sum paid by the employer. Pierce[35]
estimates that in 1997 about 73 percent of jobs have some forms of health insurance that require employer
contributions. Health Insurance has been an important part of the employee's total compensation, especially
for those who would be ineligible to purchase it privately (e.g. due to pre-existing conditions).1 The cost of
an average health insurance policy has risen signicantly in the last 10 years - data from the Kaiser/HRET
Survey of Employer Sponsored Health Benets[26][25] suggest that the average annual premium for single
health insurance coverage has more than doubled between 1999 and 2008, rising from 2,916 dollars to
4,704 dollars in nominal terms. Average annual premiums for family coverage have also risen by a similar
percentage, from 5,791 dollars in 1999 to 12,680 dollars in 2008. In terms of the costs borne by the employers,
the average per-employee health insurance premium contribution has risen from 1,878 dollars (86 percent of
the total premium) in 1999, to 3,983 dollars (85 percent of the total premium) in 2008. These data suggest
that employer provided health insurance has become more valuable to the average employee, and represent
a greater proportion of his total compensation over the last ten years.
IIa.ii. Pension Plans
Pierce[35] estimates that pension amounts to about 3 percent of the employee's total compensation. Columns
6-8 of Table 1 also show that the cost to the employer in providing pension has increased, from 75 cents in
1Pierce[35] also has estimated that in 1997, employer-provided health insurance constitutes about 5.4 percent of the em-
ployee's total compensation.
31997 (per hour worked) to $1.26 in 2008. However, as a fraction of total fringe benets, the cost of pension
has remained steady at around 21-23 percent.
IIb. Reasons for Employer Provision of Fringe Benets
There are several reasons for why employers choose to provide these fringe benets and why employees
choose to accept these benets2:
1. Cost Advantage - In accordance with the 1943 Internal Revenue Code, compensation in the form of
health insurance and pensions are tax deductible for the employer.
2. Risk Pooling - The fact that health status is an unobservable variable implies that the individual may
nd it cheaper to purchase health insurance through their employers selected schemes. Other than public
health insurance which is not universal, those who cannot or cannot aord to purchase health insurance
may nd employer-provided health insurance the only way of getting insured.
3. Productivity - If the productivity of a company is positively correlated with the health of its workforce,
then providing health insurance is certainly important to the rm's protability.
4. Human Resource Management - Fringe benets may give an impression to the employees that by
losing their job, they will lose more than their wages. Those whose entire family is covered by employer-
provided health insurance may nd it especially costly to quit their job. Since the cost to the employer
in providing these benets is lower due to risk pooling (or group discounts), it is a cost-eective human
resource control tool.
III. Data
We primarily use two dierent datasets in our analysis. First, we use the 1996-2006 data from the Annual
Demographic File/Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to
examine the trends in the recipiency of employer-provided pension and health insurance. Second, we use
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to analyze racial dierences in the recipiency
of these benets. Three additional datasets are used to aid our analyses of employer provided health
insurance take-up, and for the imputation of the values of these fringe benets. Additional descriptions of
these datasets will be provided in their respective sections.
2In addition to the following reasons Woodbury[40] also discusses the impact of rising unionization, changing age structure
of the labor force and rising income as the reasons behind the rise in proportion of total compensation going to fringe benets
over the 1960s and 1970s
4IIIa. The Current Population Survey (CPS)
The CPS is a monthly survey of about 60,000 nationally representative households. Our data come from a
further supplement questionnaire was administered in March of each year. This supplement, known as the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC),3 provides additional data on work experience, income
for the previous year, non-cash benets received, and employment situations. We use the 1996-2006 ASEC
in this study.
The pension recipiency indicator that we use in our analysis comes from two questions asked of all CPS
interviewees: 1) Other than social security did the employer or union that the interviewee worked for in (the
previous year) have a pension or other type of retirement plan for any of the employees? 2) Was he/she
included in that plan? Exactly how we dene recipiency of employer-provided pension will be discussed
below.
For employer-provided health insurance, individuals are asked: At any time in (previous calendar year),
(were you/was anyone in this household) covered by a health insurance plan provided through (their/your)
current or former employer or union? The CPS ASEC also collect information about the specics of
the plan, such as how the plan was paid (in part or full), and how much the contribution the employer
made (if the individual was covered by employer provided health insurance). Note that these questions do
not address the issue of `Take-Up' - an individual may be oered employer-provided health insurance but
decides to decline the oer, and thus he would answered that he is not covered by employer-provided health
insurance. We shall return to this issue below.
IIIb. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
We also use the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a
panel study of a sample of 12686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were rst
interviewed in 1979.45 Since then, they have been re-interviewed yearly from 1979 to 1994, and bi-annually
since 1996. The NLSY79 documents each respondent's experience, mainly with the labor market- such as
labor market attachment, training and education. A particularly attractive feature of using the NLSY79
to analyze wage dierentials is that it provides a proxy for the individual's ability - the Armed Forces
Qualication Test (AFQT) score. In 1980, over 90 percent of the NLSY79 respondents were given a set of
10 tests from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)6 and a subset of 4 of these tests
3The ASEC was called Annual Demographic Supplement (ADF) prior to 2003.
4The sample size diminished over time due to funding limitation. Sample size of the survey dropped from 12686 respondents
in 1979 to 10436 respondents in 1990.
5The NLSY79 is formally constituted by 3 subsamples: 1) A cross sectional sample of 6111 young people residing in US
in 1979. 2) A supplemental sample of 5295 young people. This sub-sample is designed to over-sample hispanics, blacks and
economically disadvantaged whites. 3) A sample of 1280 young people who were enlisted in one of the 4 branches of military as
of 30th September 1978.
6Formally, the tests in the ASVAB consist of (1) general science, (2) arithmetic reasoning, (3) word knowledge, (4) paragraph
comprehension, (5) numerical operations, (6) coding speed, (7) auto and shop information, (8) mathematical knowledge, (9)
5constitutes the AFQT. The AFQT score is used by the military services to screen applicants and thereby
assigning various jobs within the military. The use of the AFQT score as a measure of the ability of the
individual has been fairly widespread in economics and sociology.7
We mainly focus the 1996-2004 periods, because many variables of interest, such as labor union status,
employer pension provision, employer health insurance provision, are not available in the early waves of the
survey. It is also important to point out that the results generated by the NLSY79 are not comparable with
those of the CPS, because the sample in the NLSY79 is not nationally representative.
The questions in the NLSY regarding employer-provided health insurance and pension are phrased as
follows: Did the employer MAKE AVAILABLE to you (type of benet)?
IIIc. Take-Up of Fringe Benets- oer versus coverage rates
A close examination of the wording of the fringe benet questions in the CPS and the NLSY reveals that
there are two dierent underlying concepts - oer and coverage. In the CPS, questions about whether the
employer oers a pension plan are asked, but for health insurance, the individual is asked about whether
he/she is `covered' by such fringe benet. For the NLSY, the questions ask whether a particular fringe
benet was oered by the employer.
This poses a non-trivial conceptual question - whether we should use the `oer rate' or the `coverage
rate' as an indicator of recipiency as neither one of these questions address `recipiency' directly. This issue
arises because of the `take-up' problem - a worker may not receive the benet even if his employer oers
him a plan. Intuitively, if most workers decide not to take-up these benets because of endogenous reasons
(such as his disliking of the plan, or that he/she is covered by other plans), then the racial dierence in
the oer rate might be a better measurement of inequality as it is the worker's own decision that led them
not receiving the benet and using the coverage rate understates the true level of recipiency. Similarly,
if most workers are not taking up these benets because of exogenous reasons (e.g. the worker is on a
temporary contract and this ineligible for fringe benets or that the insurance company refused to accept
the worker because of his risk characteristics), then the racial dierence in the coverage rate is a more valid
measurement of inequality as the reasons for not receiving the benet is beyond the worker's own control
and using the oer rate overstates the level of recipiency. Moreover, if take-up behavior diers enormously
between race groups, then using simply the dierence in the oer rate/coverage rate between race/gender
groups will bias the true level of inequality.
We use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to study whether there are racial
dierences in the take-up of employer-provided health insurance. For simplicity, we focus on health insurance
mechanical comprehension, and (10) electronics information.
7For example, see Neal and Johnson [33].
6only. In future versions of this paper we hope to also look at reasons for not taking up employer-provided
pension plan.
SIPP is a series of short panel datasets based on a sample of nationally representative non-institutionalized
civilian population. Interviews are implemented every 4 months and individuals are asked to provide detailed
demographic and income information for the 4 months prior to the interview month.8 Occasionally, SIPP
interviewees are asked additional questions on a variety of topics such as health and physical well-being,
nancial history, etc in its topical modules. We use the wave 5 topical modules for both the 1996 and 2001
panels (these correspond to the year 1997 and 2003 respectively). In these topical modules, interviewees
are rst asked: Does your employer oer a health insurance plan to ANY of its employees?(Yes/No). For
those who are not covered by employer-provided health insurance (as reported in the core questionnaire),
the interviewer asks for the reasons of non-coverage. For this analysis, we restrict our sample to those who
are 22-64 years of age and are working in private companies.
Table 2 presents the results. The upper panel (lower panel) tabulates the results for the 1996 panel
(2001 panel). Columns 1-5 show the percentages of those who are not taking up employer-provided health
insurance by various reasons (individuals can give more than one reason so the rows do not sum to one,
and we also omit the `other reasons' category). For those white men who are not taking up employer-
provided health insurance, 29 percent in the 1996 panel did so because they are ineligible due to their type
of employment (e.g. in temporary or part-time positions). For blacks, the rate is 37 percent. A small
fraction of those who are oered health insurance did not take up because of being denied by the insurance
companies. We also see that white men are more likely than black men to decide not to take-up because they
are covered by other plans, while black men are more likely to decline employer-provided health insurance
because the plans are too expensive.
These results suggest that `ineligibility due to the type of employment' is the primary exogenous reason
for non-takeup. Therefore, we believe that by restricting our attention to only on those who are working
full-time, most of the non-takeup will be due to endogenous reasons. Thus, upon this restriction the oer
rate is a better measure of fringe benet recipiency.
Nevertheless, the CPS ASEC do not give us the employer-provided health insurance oer rates. Instead,
questions about whether the individual's current employer oers health insurance are asked in the CPS
February supplements. Unfortunately, these supplements are available only in some years (since 1996, they
are available in 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005). Given the CPS structure, we merge these February CPS data
with the CPS ASEC, thus allowing us to have access to variables in both supplements for the individual.
The cost of doing so is a sample reduction as we cannot use individuals who were interviewed in March but
not February and vice-versa.
8Readers are encouraged to refer to U.S. Census Bureau (2001) for a more thorough description of SIPP.
7In these CPS February supplements, those who are not taking up employer-provided health insurance
are also asked about the reasons for doing so. In appendix table A1, we report the percentage of those who
are not taking up such benet, by various reasons. We focus on those who are working full time and more
than 35 hours per week. Indeed, upon making this restriction, we see that most of the non-takeups are
doing so due to endogenous reasons.
IV. Trends in the provision and coverage of Fringe Benets
IVa. Trends in the provision and coverage of Employer-Provided Health Insurance
Table 3 shows the percentages of workers who are oered employer-provided health insurance using the
February and March supplements of the 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 Current Population Surveys. We
report these percentages for white men, African American men, white women and African American women
separately. We restrict our sample to those 25-64 years of age who work over 35 hours a week in the private
sector.
Overall, the percentage of workers who were oered health insurance by their employers has not changed
signicantly in the 1997-2005 period. However, we do observe a racial dierence in the oer rates - in 1997
about 89 percent of white men worked in jobs that oer health insurance, while that percentage for African
American men is only 85 percent. This gap persists over the 1997-2005 period. It is somewhat interesting
to see that the racial gap exists for women in the recipiency of this fringe benet is smaller than for men.
IVb. Trends in Employer Provided Pension
Table 3 also reports the percentages of workers who are oered a pension plan (dened contribution or
dened benet) in 1997-2005. Here we see that the racial gap in pension recipiency is much larger than that
of health insurance. Both African American men and women are less likely to work in jobs that provide them
a pension plan. In 1997, 70 percent of white male workers are oered pension plans, for African American
male workers however, this percentage is about 65 percent. In 2005, the gap is wider with 69 percent and
62 percent for white and African American men respectively. For women, about 69 percent of white women
and 67 percent of African American women are oered pension plans in 2005.
V. Racial Dierences in Fringe Benet oers
There are important dierences in characteristics of individual African American and white workers as
well as in the kinds of jobs that African American and white workers are working in. It is important
to understand the role that individual and workplace characteristics play in whether or not workers are
8oered health insurance and/or pension by the employer. In addition, we are interested in the residual
racial dierences in fringe benet oers that remain after we have controlled for dierences in individual
and workplace characteristics. In order to address these questions, we estimate simple probit regressions
where we regress a set of individual and workplace characteristics on the fringe benet dummy (either health
insurance or pension oer) for male and female samples of the data.
The regressions we estimate are of the following type, which include race as well as other individual and
workplace controls, separately for men and for women and for health insurance and pension oers:
C










C 2 fHI;Pg is a dummy variable taking the value one if individual i is oered non-wage compensation
(health insurance HI or pension P) from the employer and the value zero if not, C
i is a latent variable that
determines whether or not an individual gets oered non-wage compensation (health insurance or pension)
and Zi is the vector of individual and workplace characteristics that determine whether or not an individual
gets oered health insurance and pension. We assume the error term eC;i is distributed normally so we carry
out probit estimation of the above equations.
In addition to the regression analysis with race dummies, we also carry out the regressions on fringe
benet oers separately for each racial group and look at the dierences across racial groups. In other words,
we also report unexplained dierences in fringe benets (health insurance and pension) across racial groups
separately for men and for women, by carrying out non-linear decompositions. Unlike the regression analysis
which assumes the same returns to characteristics and traits for dierent racial groups, the decomposition
analysis does not make this assumption.
The non-linear decomposition we use is a variant of the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, as
given by
CW   CB = [(ZW   ZB)dW
C ] + [ZB(dW
C   dB
C)] (3)
where (as above) Zj is the row vector of average values of the independent variables and d
j
C is the vector
of coecient estimates for benet type C and race j. Since we want to estimate unexplained dierences in
a discrete binary variable, we use a modication of the method that decomposes the non-linear equation,
C = F(ZdC), since C does not necessarily equal F(ZdC). Following the method proposed in Fairlie[16], we
use the non-linear decomposition given by

























In the above decompositions, the rst term represents the part of the racial gap in fringe benet oers
which is due to group dierences in distribution of Z; the second term represents the part of the racial gap
due to dierences in group processes determining the level of C 2 fHI;Pg. The second component is the
part of the racial gap in fringe benet oers which cannot be explained by the racial dierences in individual
and workplace characteristics.
In order to estimate the contribution of racial dierences in individual characteristics using Fairlie (2005),
the standard errors associated with these are estimated by the delta method. The decomposition method
involves a one to one matching between the African American and white workers. Since there are fewer
African American workers than white workers, samples are drawn randomly from the white sample. Fifty
dierent samples are drawn, racial dierences estimated using each sample and the mean results from across
the fty dierent samples reported.
Va. Racial Dierences in Fringe Benets at the extensive margin
The appendix tables A2 and A3 provide summary statistics of individual and workplace characteristics by
race and gender for the samples drawn from the Current Population Surveys. The data is constructed by
merging respondents from the February and March supplements of the Current Population Surveys; since
the February supplements are available for specic years we have data for the 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005
cohorts. Further, we restrict our sample to workers who are between the ages of 25 and 65, to full-time
workers who work more than 35 hours per week and who work in the private sector. These restrictions
give us a sample of 51,736 white men, 4,271 African American men, 35,190 white women and 4,702 African
American women.
A larger fraction of all workers are oered employer provided health insurance than pensions. The highest
fraction of health insurance oers is for white men, of whom 90% get health insurance oers. 87% of the
African American men get health insurance oers, while 85% of both white and African American women
get health insurance oers. The highest fraction of pension oers is also for white men at 74%. African
American men get the lowest fraction of pension oers at 67%. 71% of white women and 69% of African
American women get pension oers. If one looks at groups receiving both fringe benets, then again white
men have the highest oer rates of health insurance and pensions at 71% and African American men have
the lowest oer rates at 64%. White women have oer rates of 66% and African American women of 64%.
Summary statistics of individual characteristics of the CPS samples as given in appendix tables A2 and
A3 show that the African American samples are more likely to have some high school, high school or some
10college education but that the white samples are far more likely to have college graduate or higher education.
Women are slightly younger in the sample in comparison to men. There are also far more African American
workers in the South than in any other region, which is consistent with the population distribution of African
Americans in the US. African American women are more likely to have younger children at home, and spouse
wages are far higher for white women than for African American women.
Workplace characteristics across dierent race and gender groups in the CPS samples show that African
Americans are far more likely to be working in unionized jobs than white workers. They are also more likely
to work in the largest rms (those with 1000+ workers) than are white workers. White workers are more
likely to be in executive/professional and sales occupations while African American workers are more likely
to be in factory labor and construction, services and transportation occupations. Women are more likely to
be in administrative occupations. Across dierent industries, manufacturing has higher fractions of African
Americans than whites, while nancial and education/health services are dominated by women.
Given the CPS data, we next run the dierent specications on the samples. Table 4 reports the
estimation results for health insurance oers when using the CPS data for full time workers working in
the private sector from the 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 cohorts. The cohorts are pooled together, and year
dummies included in all estimations. Panel A gives the results when race dummies are included in the
probit regressions and Panel B gives the results from the non-linear decompositions. In (I), estimation
results are reported when we use individual level controls only which include human capital variables such
as education and age, family traits variables such as children and spouse salary and also local labor market
variables such as regional dummies. The set of dummy variables for education are: whether the worker
has no education, some high school education, high school education or college/grad school education. We
use four region dummies. According to the estimations the marginal eect of being African American on
whether a person gets a health insurance oer from the employer is negative and signicant at -0.0161 for
men; for women the marginal eect of being African American is insignicant. In (II), estimation results
are reported when workplace or rm level controls are included in addition to the individual level variables.
These include union membership, 9 rm size, occupation, and industry. We use ve dummy variables for
rm size: whether number of employees in the rm are less than 25, between 25 and 99, between 100 and
499, between 500 and 999 or greater than 1000. We use eight dummies for occupation and thirteen dummies
for industry. Inclusion of workplace controls increases the marginal eect associated with being African
American to almost twice its level without the rm level controls for the male samples, -0.0293 instead
9Since 1983, questions on union/employment association membership are asked only to a quarter of the sample (the outgoing
rotation groups) in each month (Hirsch and Macpherson). To obtain information of union membership for the remaining three
quarters of the sample in each year, we make use their responses to the Basic CPS survey in the following months. Specically,
we look at their responses to the questions on union membership during their outgoing interviews. We also restrict to those
who do not experience unemployment between the ASEC and their outgoing interview. Doing so essentially eliminate those
who changed jobs during this period, which will contaminate our data (i.e. the employer that oers pension may not be the
employer the interviewee worked for during the month when he answered the union membership questions).
11of -0.0161. The increase in the marginal eect is because African American men are more likely to be in
unionized and bigger rms which are the kind of rms more likely to oer fringe benets. For women,
the marginal eect of being African American is now negative but still insignicant. In the decomposition
results, inclusion of the latter set of control variables changes the component of the explained dierence
from positive to negative. In other words, racial dierences in workplace controls favor health insurance
coverage for African American men and women. The unexplained dierences in health insurance coverage
across race, however, favors white men and women.
Table 5 gives the estimation results for pension oers with a race dummy included in the set of regressors
in section A and from non-linear decompositions in section B. Table 5 uses CPS data for full time workers
working in the private sector from 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 cohorts. In (I), estimation results are reported
when individual level controls only are included. The marginal eect of being African American on getting
an oer of pension coverage is signicant and negative for men at -0.0354. For women the marginal eect is
negative but insignicant. In (II), estimation results are reported when workplace controls are included in
addition to individual level controls. Inclusion of workplace controls increases the marginal eect associated
with the African American dummy on getting an oer of pension coverage to -0.0791 from -0.0354 for men and
to -0.0522 for women. The marginal eect of being African American is signicantly negative after including
workplace controls, for both the male and female sub-samples. In the decomposition results, inclusion of
the workplace controls changes the component of the explained dierence from positive to negative. As for
health insurance, the racial dierences in workplace controls favors pension oers for African American men
and women. The unexplained dierence in pension oers across race favors white men and women.
From the CPS data, being African American is associated with signicantly lower oer rates for employer
provided health insurance and employer provided pension for men. These dierences are particularly large
once we control for workplace characteristics since African Americans are infact more likely to be working
in the kind of jobs (unionized and with larger rms) that provide these fringe benets. The dierences in
fringe benet oers are smaller for women in the CPS samples. One explanation for why we observe the
racial dierences for men could be associated with how African American men sort into dierent rms, with
more of them working for employers that may be less prejudiced in hiring African Americans but who at the
same time oer fewer fringe benets. The other reason we might observe the racial dierences is because
of important omitted variables. In the next section, we control for an important source of omitted variable
bias, which is ability dierence across racial groups.
Vb. Racial Dierences in Fringe Benets at the extensive margin and the role of ability
Using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth data allows us to use a more rich set of individual level
controls in our models of fringe benet oers. In particular we are interested in how racial dierences in
12ability, as proxied by the AFQT test score, have an impact on racial dierences in employer provided fringe
benets such as health insurance and pensions. The role of ability in wage dierentials is well documented.
The mechanism through which ability dierences can also play a role in fringe benets and compensation is
through the progressive nature of the tax system. High ability individuals may nd it worthwhile to take a
larger portion of their compensation in the form of tax exempt fringe benets.
The appendix tables A4 and A5 provide summary statistics of individual and workplace characteristics
by race and gender for the samples drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data. The data
we use is pooled from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 rounds of the NLSY data. We restrict our sample
to workers who are between the ages of 25 and 65, and to full-time workers who work more than 35 hours
per week. These restrictions give us a sample of 1,607 white men, 652 African American men, 1,284 white
women and 678 African American women.
A broadly similar fraction of all workers are oered fringe benets in the NLSY data in comparison to
the CPS. As many as 86% of white men get oers of health insurance, while 79% of African American men
get such oers. 85% of white women and African American women get oers of health insurance. The
fraction of pension oers for white men is 75%. 68% of African American men get pension oers. 75% of
white women and 77% of African American women get pension oers. That African American women have
higher oer rates of pension in the NLSY is observed also in the sub-sample of workers who work in the
private sector only (see appendix table A6). White men also have the highest oer rates of both health
insurance and pensions at 71% while 64% of African American men have oers of both health insurance and
pensions. White women have oer rates of 66% and African American women of 64%.
Summary statistics of individual characteristics of the NLSY samples show that, as in the CPS, the
African American samples are more likely to have some high school, high school or some college education
but that the white samples are far more likely to have college graduate or higher education. Again as in
the CPS, there are far more African American workers in the South than in any other region, which is
consistent with the population distribution of African Americans in the US. African American women are
the most likely to have younger children at home, and spouse wages are far higher for white women than for
African American women. Finally, the AFQT scores (standardized by age) are very dierent across African
Americans and whites, with the mean score being positive for whites and negative for African Americans.
Workplace characteristics across dierent race and gender groups in the NLSY samples show that African
Americans are more likely to be working in unionized jobs than white workers. They are also more likely to
work in the largest rms than are white workers. Both of these are again consistent with CPS data. White
workers are more likely to be in Professional, Technical and Managerial occupations while African American
workers are more likely to be in clerical, operatives and service occupations.
Table 6 gives the estimation results from probit regressions on health insurance oers with a race dummy
13in section A and from non-linear decompositions in section B. We use data for full time workers from 1996
to 2006 rounds of the NLSY, the data being pooled with year dummies included in the estimations. In
(I), estimation results are reported when we use individual level controls such as education, age, region,
children, and spouse salary in the regressions. In (II) estimation results are reported with the addition
of the AFQT test score, standardized by age. In (III), estimation results are reported when we include
workplace controls such as union membership, rm size, occupation, industry and work type but exclude
AFQT. In (IV) we again add standardized AFQT scores to the set of regressors. With the addition of AFQT
test scores the marginal eect associated with being African American is dramatically reduced and becomes
insignicant. For women the marginal eect associated with being African American is not signicant
without AFQT but with the addition of AFQT it is signicant and positive. This can also be seen in the
non-linear decompositions; inclusion of the AFQT score for men reduces the dierence between rows (6)
and (7), which is the dierence in health insurance oer rates favoring white men and not explained by
dierences in characteristics. For women, inclusion of AFQT score increases the dierence between rows (6)
and (7), which is the dierence in health insurance oer rates favoring African American women and not
explained by dierences in characteristics.
Table 7 gives the estimation results from probit regressions on pension oers with a race dummy in
section A and from non-linear decompositions in section B. Table 7 use NLSY79 data for full time workers
from 1996 to 2006 rounds, the data being pooled with year dummies included in the estimation. (I) gives
the estimation results when individual level controls such as education, age, region, children, and spouse
salary are used as the control variables. In (II) estimation results are reported with inclusion of the AFQT
test score, standardized by age. In (III), estimation results are reported when we include workplace controls
such as union membership, rm size, occupation, industry and work type but exclude AFQT. In (IV) we
again add standardized AFQT scores to the set of regressors. The marginal eect associated with being
African American becomes insignicant when we include AFQT scores for men. For women the marginal
eect associated with being African American is positive and increases dramatically when we include AFQT
test scores. This can also be seen in the non-linear decompositions; inclusion of the AFQT score for men
reduces the dierence between rows (6) and (7), which is the dierence in pension oers not explained by
dierences in characteristics. For women, inclusion of AFQT increases the dierence between rows (6) and
(7) which is the dierence in pension oers favoring African American women.
As a further robustness check, we also carry out the above analysis on samples restricted further to
workers in the private sector only. The appendix tables A6 and A7 provide summary statistics of individual
and workplace characteristics by race and gender for the restricted samples. The restricted sample consists
of 1,240 white men, 476 African American men, 811 white women and 397 African American women.
Table 8 gives the estimation results from probit regressions on health insurance oers with a race dummy
14in section A and from non-linear decompositions in section B for the restricted sample. With the addition
of AFQT test scores the marginal eect of being African American for men again declines. For women the
marginal eect of being African American becomes positive and signicant after inclusion of AFQT scores,
as with the full sample. The results from the non-linear decompositions are also consistent with the results
we get from the full sample.
Table 9 gives the estimation results from probit regressions on pension oers with a race dummy in
section A and from non-linear decompositions in section B using the restricted sample. The results are
entirely consistent with what we observe in the full sample; the marginal eect associated with being
African American is reduced considerably after inclusion of AFQT scores for men. For women, the marginal
eect is positive and signicant and increases when we include AFQT scores to the set of regressors. Finally,
this is also reected in the non-linear decompositions, the unexplained dierence in pension oers is reduced
when we include AFQT scores for men, and the unexplained dierence favoring African American women
increases when we include AFQT scores for women.
As mentioned already, the CPS is a nationally representative sample while the NLSY is not; our results
from the two samples are broadly consistent but there are also some important dierences. The biggest
dierence in the NLSY data is in pension oers for women, in particular pension oers for African American
women in the NLSY are far higher than in the CPS.
An important nding is the role of ability dierences in fringe benet oers. We nd that once we control
for ability dierences much of the racial dierences in fringe benet oers disappear for men. For women,
controlling for ability actually makes the race dummy positive and signicant; in other words, controlling
for ability dierences, African American women are more likely to get fringe benets than white women.
We have no simple explanation for why this is the case, but we leave this as a question to address for future
work. We next turn to measure of overall compensation and racial dierences in compensation.
VI. Racial Dierences in Compensation
We dene total compensation as the combined value of wages, health insurance and pension. While both
the NLSY and the CPS ASEC ask about the magnitude of the wage the individual gets, the values of health
insurance and pension are not asked. A plausible reason is that they are extremely dicult to measure from
the perspective of the employee. The value of employer provided health insurance depends on the individual's
health status, the nature of the plan, and the coverage particulars. Similarly, the value of pension to the
employee depends on the current and future interest rates, the individual's assessment of future ination,
the self assessed probability of death before retirement etc. From the perspective of the employer, however,
the values of these non-wage compensation items are not simple to assess either. Provision of such non wage
15compensation may improve the productivity of employees and increase the retention rates, which are both
benecial to the employer, making the value of non-wage compensation depend on more than just the costs
involved in providing them.
To abstract from the complexity in modeling the value of non wage compensation, we assume their values
are just the direct costs to provide them. In the CPS ASEC, individuals who are covered by employer-
provided health insurance are also asked about the amount of contribution of the employer. Since the
CPS asks about the dollar amount of health insurance premium contributed by the employer, we estimate a
regression of these dollar amount on age, gender, occupations, industries, regions, unionization, years, nature
of the plan (single or family) and number of employees in the place of work. We use the resulting estimates to
impute the employer's contribution of health insurance premium for those who are oered but not covered.
For pension, however, the CPS ASEC does not ask about the amount of employer's contribution. To estimate
the amount paid by the employer, we use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) which ask about the
amount of employer's contribution towards the employee's pension (as a percent of the employee's wage).
10 We then apply these contribution rates to the CPS data and estimate the employer's contribution. Our
wage data come from the March CPS; one possible concern with the use of this data is it is not a point
in time measure, rather it is retrospective so that hourly wages need to be computed by dividing annual
earnings by the product of weeks worked last year and usual weekly hours last year.
For NLSY, the issues involved in imputing values of non wage compensation schemes are more compli-
cated. First, as we discussed previously, the NLSY asks whether the individual's employer makes a certain
type of non-wage compensation available to him, rather than whether the individual is covered by such
compensation. Second, for health insurance, we do not know the amount paid by the employer as well as
the type of health insurance (such as whether it is a single or family plan). Thus we assume that in the
NLSY, individuals who are oered non-wage compensation schemes always accept them. To impute the
value of employer-provided pension, we again use the contribution rates estimated using the SCFs. For
health insurance, we again use the CPS ASEC to estimate the amount paid by the employer based on the
individual's demographic and occupational characteristics (see footnote above).
VIa. Racial Dierences in Compensation over time
If we examine the total change in wages, non-wage compensation and compensation measures over the 1997-
2005 time period (as given in gure 1), we nd that wages increased across the distribution for men and
women during 1997-2005, but that there was a decline in non-wage compensation in the lower percentiles
for both men and women over this time period, so that the change in compensation was slightly smaller
10The SCF is a triennial cross-sectional survey containing detail data about the interviewees' income, assets and investment
portfolios. We use the 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004 SCF to estimate the average pension contribution rates (employers). We use
the averages of the 1995 and 1998 rates, 1998 and 2001 rates, 2001 and 2004 rates as the rates in 1996-1997, 1999-2000, and
2002-2003 respectively.
16than the change in wages.
In order to examine the racial inequality in compensation we also estimate and examine three dierent
measures of within group inequality: the overall inequality as given by the 90/10 log dierential in com-
pensation for the dierent years for which we have data on fringe benet oers, the residual inequality as
given by 90/10 log dierential in compensation after we control for age and education and the upper and
lower tail inequality as given by 90/50 and 50/10 log dierentials in compensation. We use the CPS data
for full-time workers working in the private sector who are between the ages of 25 and 65.
Figure 2 gives the 90/10 log dierential in compensation and the residual 90/10 log dierential in
compensation separately for African American and white men. From gure 2, the 90/10 inequality measure
has increased for wages, for non-wage compensation and for compensation for both whites and African
Americans. However, the 90/10 inequality in wages and compensation is higher among whites while the
90/10 inequality in non-wage compensation is higher among African Americans. If we look at the residual
90/10 inequality which controls for age and education, then the 90/10 inequality measures in wages and
compensation are not very dierent among whites and among African Americans, but there is still higher
inequality in non-wage compensation among African American men than white men.
Figure 3 gives the 90/10 log dierential in compensation and the residual 90/10 log dierential in
compensation among African American and white women. Very generally, the trends we observe are similar
to those for men, with the inequality measures increasing over the time period, the inequality in wages and
compensation being fairly similar among African American and white women but the inequality in non-wage
compensation being higher among African American women than among white women.
It is also useful to understand how the compensation inequality measures vary across African Americans
and whites when we examine upper and lower tail inequality as given by the 90/50 and 50/10 inequality
measures. Figure 4 gives these upper and lower tail inequality measures for male samples of the CPS. Upper
tail inequality is increasing over the time period, the upper tail inequality in wages and compensation is not
very dierent among African Americans and whites but the upper tail inequality in non-wage compensation
is higher among African Americans than whites. Lower tail inequality in wages and compensation has
not changed over time, in particular for white men. For African American men, lower tail inequality in
both wages and in compensation dips initially but increases in 2005. Lower tail inequality in non-wage
compensation is higher among African American men than among whites and has increased over time.
The upper and lower tail inequality for the female samples of the CPS is given in gure 5. For the female
samples, the upper tail inequality as given by the 90/50 inequality measure has slightly increased for wages
and for compensation. It remains constant for non-wage compensation. Upper tail inequality for wages,
non-wage compensation and compensation is higher among African American women than among white
women. Lower tail inequality in wages and compensation is constant over time but lower tail inequality in
17non-wage compensation increases and is higher among African American women than among white women.
Our ndings are broadly consistent with the existing literature on inequality dierences over time (for
instance in Autor, Katz and Kearney [3] [4]). We nd, in addition, that non-wage compensation inequality
is greater among African Americans than among whites and that the dispersion in non-wage compensation
and compensation is also greater among African Americans than whites over the last decade. This again
highlights the importance of examining fringe benets and compensation to get a better understanding of
the extent of racial inequalities in the labor market.
VIb. Racial Dierences in Compensation and the role of ability
We also examine how unexplained dierences in total compensation across racial groups are aected by in-
clusion of AFQT test scores using NLSY data. We do this by carrying out quantile decompositions of total
compensation, with and without including AFQT in the set of characteristics (other characteristics include
education, tenure and the square of tenure). While the Oaxaca-Blinder and non-linear decompositions given
in equations 1 and 2 estimate the average treatment eect on the treated by using linear/non-linear regres-
sions (the rst parts of equations 3 and 4 or the explained dierence across groups), quantile decompositions
extend the method to quantiles by using linear quantile regressions (see Melly[29]). These allow us to exam-
ine the unexplained dierences across racial groups at dierent points of the distribution of wages, non-wage
compensation and of total compensation; in this way we are also able to examine if ability dierences play
a role in non-wage compensation at the intensive margin.
In order to examine the role of ability in racial dierences in compensation, we rst pool the NLSY data
from 1996 to 2006 for all full time workers between the ages of 25 and 65 and estimate the unexplained
dierences (unexplained after controlling for education, age and a quadratic in age). 95% condence in-
tervals are estimated around the unexplained dierence using 100 bootstrap replications. Figure 6 gives
the estimation results for men and 7 gives the estimation results for women. The gures superimpose the
unexplained dierences with and without inclusion of standardized AFQT scores for easy reference. It is
clear from the pooled male samples that inclusion of standardized AFQT scores reduces the unexplained
dierence in wages (this is already well documented) and also in non-wage compensation (at the intensive
margin so conditional on getting fringe benets, ability dierences also play a role in the amount that is
received in the form on non-wage compensation) and compensation at all points of the distribution. The
dierence is fairly large so that the 95% condence intervals for the two cases do not overlap. For the pooled
female samples also, we nd that inclusion of standardized AFQT scores reduces unexplained dierences
in wages, non-wage compensation and compensation. However, unlike for men, the dierence in non-wage
compensation is not very large, there is considerable overlap in the condence regions of the unexplained
dierence estimated with and without including AFQT test scores.
18We also examine the role of ability dierences when we restrict the NLSY sample further to workers who
work only in the private sector. The resulting unexplained dierences across racial groups are given in gure
8 for men and gure 9 for women. As in the full sample, there is a reduction in unexplained dierences
after including standardized AFQT scores across the entire distributions of wages, non-wage compensation
and compensation, and in addition there is also little overlap in the 95% condence intervals across the
unexplained dierence.
VII. Caveats and Directions for Future Work
Several caveats are in order. First, our assumption that by focusing only on those who are employed full-time
and work over 35 hours per week, we eliminate all those who are not taking up Health Insurance because of
exogenous reasons. It is however plausible that those who know that they cannot take up employer-provided
health insurance due to exogenous reasons may instead report that non-takeup is a personal choice. If this
happens, the oer rate overstates the recipiency of these fringe benets. More seriously, if this behavior
diers across race and gender groups, then our results may be invalid. This issue is not easy to resolve as
one would need to nd out whether those who reject employer-provided health insurance due to personal
decision are actually ineligible for such benet.
Second, our empirical strategy has made a large number of simplications. In the case of imputing the
value of an employer-provided pension plan, our strategy is somewhat over-simplied due to data limitations.
In future revisions of this paper, we hope to devise a more sophisticated method of calculating the value of
a pension plan, if we have better data.
Third, we have utilized only the employer-cost of fringe benets rather than their values in analyzing
racial dierence in total compensation. In the case of employer-provided health insurance, it is likely that
those with bad health would value such benet much higher than the cost (because they have diculties
to purchase the insurance privately due to their risks). If there is a signicant dierence in health status
across the racial groups, it may be viable to derive a measure of the personal value of total compensation
rather than just its monetary value. There is some medical literature that suggests that African Americans
are likely to be in worse health than whites, thus the value of employer provided health insurance to African
Americans may actually be higher.
Fourth, there are other fringe benets that we hope to incorporate in our paper, such as life insurance.
Fifth, we can also study total compensation inequality for those in the lower section of the income
distribution (or those with less education). Such an analysis may capture a somewhat dierent picture
compared with that of using wages alone. It will also be interesting to see how the inclusion of the value of
fringe benets aects the poverty rates.
19VIII. Conclusion
We nd that white men have signicantly higher employer-provided health insurance and pension coverage
than do African American men. Of the unexplained racial dierences that favor white men, a large com-
ponent disappears when we control for racial dierences in ability. The racial dierences for women are
smaller than for men in fringe benet recepiency, for both health insurance and pensions. Once we control
for racial dierences in ability, we nd that African American women are actually more likely to receive
fringe benets than are white women.
We also construct total compensation measures and examine within-group inequality in compensation
over time as well as the role of ability dierences in between-group compensation inequality. We nd
that non-wage compensation inequality is greater among African Americans than among whites and that
the dispersion in non-wage compensation and compensation is also greater among African Americans than
whites over the last decade. In addition, we nd that ability dierences reduce the unexplained racial
dierences in compensation for men and women across the compensation distribution. This again highlights
the importance of racial dierences in ability in fringe benets and compensation, at the intensive as well
as extensive margins.
Several questions remain unanswered. For instance, it is not clear what causes racial dierences in non-
wage compensation to be so dierent for men and women. Our study also suggests a number of ideas for
future research. Given the increasing interest in the Hispanics population, one can also explore more about
the racial inequality between Hispanics and whites. Second, our investigation of take-up behavior suggests
a substantial number of individuals are not taking-up employer provided health insurance for personal
reasons such as not believing health insurance and do not like the plan. With longitudinal data, one can
investigate the long-term health well-being of these individuals as well as for their family members. With
rm level data, one can also investigate the characteristics of health insurance plans that make employees
not to take up. Future studies should look at a greater variety of non-wage compensation benets provided
to employees in addition to health insurance and pensions. A better understanding of the dierences in
non-wage compensation across racial groups is important in proper measurement of the extent of racial
inequalities in labor markets.
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24Table 2: Employer-Provided Health Insurance Take-Up Rates, and Reasons for Not Taking Up, by race and
gender
Reasons for Not Taking Up Employer HI (Among Those Not Taking Up)
Ineligible due Denied by the Personal
SIPP to type of Insurance Covered by Too Reasons other
Panel employment Company Other Plans Expensive than cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1996 White-Male 0.291 0.012 0.355 0.164 0.084
White-Female 0.300 0.013 0.461 0.112 0.059
Black-Male 0.370 0.003 0.242 0.199 0.079
Black-Female 0.362 0.014 0.302 0.153 0.050
2001 White-Male 0.244 0.012 0.375 0.160 0.069
White-Female 0.265 0.007 0.471 0.099 0.046
Black-Male 0.223 0.006 0.332 0.179 0.095
Black-Female 0.305 0.016 0.287 0.217 0.058
1 Data come from the wave 5 topical modules of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.
2 The sample is restricted to those who are currently working in private companies and those who are 22-64 years of age.
3 Column 1 shows the percentage of workers who are oered health insurance by their employers. Column 2 shows the
percentage of workers who are covered by employer-provided health insurance. Columns 3-7 show the percentages of
those who are not taking up employer provided health insurance due to various reasons (individuals may elect more
than one reason for not taking up).
Table 3: CPS Health Insurance and Pension Plans Oer Rates
A. Health Insurance Plans
All Men Women
Year HI Oered White Black White Black
1997 0.8782 0.8895 0.8462 0.8678 0.8571
1999 0.8759 0.8914 0.8568 0.8577 0.8537
2001 0.8802 0.8878 0.8620 0.8725 0.8716
2005 0.8660 0.8722 0.8280 0.8625 0.8561
B. Pension Plans
All Men Women
Year P Oered White Black White Black
1997 0.6963 0.7028 0.6492 0.6976 0.6551
1999 0.7094 0.7224 0.6836 0.6986 0.6670
2001 0.7043 0.7103 0.6285 0.7119 0.6583
2005 0.6850 0.6880 0.6231 0.6896 0.6691
1 Data come from the CPS February Supplements and CPS Annual Demographic Files/Annual Social and Economic Supple-
ments.
2 We restrict the sample to those 25-64 years old who work above 35 hours a week in the private sector.
25Table 4: Racial dierences in health insurance, CPS data
Male Sample Female Sample
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Controls:
(1) Education, age, region, children, spouse
salary
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) Add union membership, rm size, occupa-
tion, industry
No Yes No Yes
(A) Combined sample with race dummies
(3) Black marginal eect -0.0161*** -0.0293*** 0.0043 -0.0164
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0088) (0.0091)
(B) Non-linear decompositions
(4) Total dierence 0.0301 0.0301 0.0025 0.0025
(5) Explained by characteristics 0.0125 -0.0001 0.0081 -0.0094
1 Combined dataset from 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2005 CPS cohorts, full time workers in private sector only.
2 In all regressions and decompositions, year dummies are included.
3 Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Racial dierences in pensions, CPS data
Male Sample Female Sample
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Controls:
(1) Education, age, region, children, spouse
salary
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) Add union membership, rm size, occupa-
tion, industry
No Yes No Yes
(A) Combined sample with race dummies
(3) Black marginal eect -0.0354*** -0.0791*** -0.0020 -0.0522***
(0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0130)
(B) Non-linear decompositions
(4) Total dierence 0.0609 0.0609 0.0182 0.0182
(5) Explained by characteristics 0.0263 -0.0048 0.0176 -0.0226
1 Combined dataset from 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2005 CPS cohorts, full time workers in private sector only.
2 In all regressions and decompositions, year dummies are included.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Reasons for Non-Takeup in Employer-Provided Health Insurance
Men Women
White Black White Black
Reason for not taking up
Another plan 0.5933 0.4892 0.7399 0.5817
Traded for higher pay 0.0048 0.0039 0.0060 0.0050
Too expensive 0.2140 0.2750 0.1438 0.2562
Don't need Health Insurance 0.0157 0.0236 0.0094 0.0111
Pre-existing condition 0.0053 0.0039 0.0018 0.0012
Havent worked for long 0.0662 0.0864 0.0358 0.0656
Contract or temp employee 0.0017 0.0059 0.0006 0.0000
Other 0.0991 0.1120 0.0627 0.0792
5874 509 7832 808
1 Data come from the February Supplements of the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005
Current Population Surveys.
2 As a fraction of White (Black) Men (Women) who do not receive HI from the employer
3 Includes all workers between ages 25 and 65 who work more than 35 hours per week, are
not enrolled in school and not in the armed forces
40Table A2: Individual level characteristics, CPS data
Men Women
White Black White Black
HI 0.9013 0.8712 0.8525 0.8500
(0.0016) (0.0069) (0.0025) (0.0088)
Pension 0.7357 0.6747 0.7104 0.6922
(0.0023) (0.0097) (0.0032) (0.0113)
Both HI and Pension 0.7101 0.6352 0.6618 0.6440
(0.0024) (0.0099) (0.0033) (0.0118)
Education
Below High School 0.0344 0.0323 0.0201 0.0096
(0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0024)
Some High School 0.0599 0.0927 0.0428 0.0729
(0.0012) (0.0060) (0.0014) (0.0064)
High School 0.3189 0.3912 0.3569 0.3675
(0.0024) (0.0101) (0.0033) (0.0118)
Some College 0.2667 0.2989 0.3097 0.3325
(0.0023) (0.0094) (0.0032) (0.0116)
College graduate and above 0.3201 0.1849 0.2705 0.2175
(0.0024) (0.0080) (0.0031) (0.0101)
Age 43 43 42 41
(0.0512) (0.2003) (0.0676) (0.2320)
Region
Northeast 0.2182 0.1752 0.2191 0.1910
(0.0022) (0.0078) (0.0029) (0.0097)
Midwest 0.2758 0.1743 0.2839 0.1711
(0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0031) (0.0092)
South 0.2875 0.5595 0.2969 0.5524
(0.0024) (0.0102) (0.0032) (0.0122)
West 0.2186 0.0910 0.2000 0.0855
(0.0022) (0.0059) (0.0028) (0.0069)
Children
# of children younger than 6=1,2 0.2606 0.2564 0.1725 0.2108
(0.0023) (0.0090) (0.0026) (0.0100)
# of children younger than 6=3,4 0.0114 0.0089 0.0026 0.0024
(0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0012)
# of children younger than 6=5,6 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0006)
Spouse Wages 20586 21796 42913 34809
(143) (530) (318) (812)
N 51736 4271 35190 4702
1 Data from 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 cohorts of the CPS, full time workers in the
private sector only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
41Table A3: Firm level characteristics, CPS data
Men Women
White Black White Black
Union Membership 0.1493 0.2245 0.0697 0.1416
(0.0019) (0.0086) (0.0018) (0.0086)
Firm Size
< 25 employees 0.1985 0.1514 0.2093 0.1301
(0.0021) (0.0074) (0.0028) (0.0083)
25   99 employees 0.1600 0.1356 0.1511 0.1084
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0025) (0.0076)
100   499 employees 0.1757 0.1628 0.1758 0.1620
(0.0020) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0090)
500   999 employees 0.0639 0.0753 0.0682 0.0934
(0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0018) (0.0071)
1000+ employees 0.4019 0.4749 0.3955 0.5060
(0.0026) (0.0103) (0.0034) (0.0123)
Occupation
Executive, Professional 0.3655 0.2117 0.4170 0.3277
(0.0025) (0.0084) (0.0034) (0.0115)
Sales 0.1258 0.0702 0.1148 0.0795
(0.0017) (0.0053) (0.0022) (0.0066)
Administrative 0.0439 0.0727 0.2741 0.2488
(0.0011) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0106)
Farming, Fisheries and Forestry 0.0125 0.0102 0.0038 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Factory Labor and Construction 0.3332 0.3827 0.0908 0.1404
(0.0025) (0.0100) (0.0020) (0.0085)
Services 0.0391 0.0982 0.0915 0.1892
(0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0020) (0.0096)
Transportation 0.0800 0.1543 0.0081 0.0139
(0.0014) (0.0075) (0.0006) (0.0029)
Industry
Agriculture, forestry 0.0140 0.0060 0.0057 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Mining 0.0187 0.0068 0.0038 0.0018
(0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Construction 0.0939 0.0629 0.0163 0.0084
(0.0015) (0.0050) (0.0009) (0.0022)
Manufacturing 0.2935 0.3261 0.1597 0.1747
(0.0024) (0.0097) (0.0026) (0.0093)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.1878 0.1603 0.1720 0.1096
(0.0020) (0.0076) (0.0026) (0.0077)
Transportation and utilities 0.0867 0.1288 0.0300 0.0265
(0.0015) (0.0069) (0.0012) (0.0039)
Information 0.0246 0.0319 0.0205 0.0343
(0.0008) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0045)
Financial activities 0.0658 0.0519 0.1394 0.1373
(0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0024) (0.0085)
Professional and business 0.0756 0.0740 0.0662 0.0663
(0.0014) (0.0054) (0.0017) (0.0061)
Educational and health services 0.0635 0.0850 0.2884 0.3500
(0.0013) (0.0058) (0.0032) (0.0117)
Leisure and hospitality 0.0549 0.0417 0.0661 0.0452
(0.0012) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.0051)
Other services 0.0210 0.0247 0.0319 0.0452
(0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0012) (0.0051)
N 51736 4271 35190 4702
1 Data from 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 cohorts of the CPS, full time workers in the
private sector only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
42Table A4: Individual level characteristics, pooled NLSY data
Men Women
White Black White Black
HI 0.8620 0.7925 0.8523 0.8468
(0.0036) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0060)
Pension 0 .7508 0.6751 0.7468 0.7666
(0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0052) (0.0070)
Both HI and Pension 0 .7375 0.6596 0.7255 0.7471
(0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0053) (0.0072)
Education
Below High School 0 .0235 0.0123 0.0150 0 .0066
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Some High School 0.0827 0.0980 0.0485 0.0601
(0.0029) (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0039)
High School 0.4276 0.5359 0.4205 0.3951
(0.0052) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0081)
Some College 0.2021 0.2169 0.2623 0.3522
(0.0042) (0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0079)
College Graduate and Above 0.2640 0.1365 0.2535 0.1857
(0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0064)
Age 39 38 39 39
(0.0382) (0.0576) (0.0435) (0.0591)
Region
Northeast 0.1688 0.1299 0.1459 0.1169
(0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0053)
North Central 0.2875 0.1626 0.2588 0.1709
(0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0062)
South 0.3240 0.6290 0.3871 0.6480
(0.0049) (0.0078) (0.0058) (0.0079)
West 0.2195 0.0783 0.2080 0.0640
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0040)
Child 1.3515 0.9744 1.3647 1.5449
(0.0136) (0.0203) (0.0137) (0.0206)
Spouse Wage 15290 10496 27997 11578
(268) (305) (426) (371)
Standardized AFQT score 0.3302 -0.6356 0.1995 -0.5857
(0.0107) (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0117)
N 1,607 652 1,284 678
1 Data from pooled 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 cohorts of the NLSY, full time
workers only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
43Table A5: Firm level characteristics, pooled NLSY data
Men Women
White Black White Black
Union Membership 0.1834 0.2061 0.1392 0.1896
(0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0041) (0.0065)
Firm Size 1264 1632 1241 1660
(91) (171) (104) (173)
Occupation
Professional, Technical and Kindred 0.1753 0.1091 0.2512 0.1846
(0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0064)
Managers, Ocials and Proprietors 0.1889 0.0909 0.1919 0.1166
(0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0053)
Sales Workers 0.0541 0.0334 0.0585 0.0389
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0032)
Clerical and Kindred 0.0573 0.0722 0.2727 0.2731
(0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0074)
Craftsmen, Foremen and Kindred 0.2536 0.2320 0.0440 0.0540
(0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0024) (0.0037)
Armed Forces 0.0006 0.0013 0 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0) (0.0003)
Operatives and Kindred 0.1347 0.2222 0.0560 0.0871
(0.0036) (0.0067) (0.0027) (0.0047)
Farm Laborers and Foreman 0.0519 0.0806 0.0135 0.0097
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0016)
Service Workers, except Private HH 0.0830 0.1579 0.1108 0.2330
(0.0029) (0.0059) (0.0037) (0.0070)
Private Household 0.0002 0 0.0010 0.0019
(0.0001) (0) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 0.0241 0.0126 0.0111 0.0013
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0006)
Mining 0.0092 0.0039 0.0037 0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Construction 0.1184 0.1022 0.0182 0.0064
(0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Manufacturing 0.2434 0.2288 0.1417 0.1353
(0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0057)
Transportation, Communication, Public Utilities 0.1064 0.1286 0.0561 0.0721
(0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.0043)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.1437 0.1436 0.1449 0.1180
(0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0042) (0.0053)
Finance, Insurance and Real estate 0.0508 0.0297 0.0920 0.0749
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Business and repair services 0.0664 0.0790 0.0450 0.0467
(0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0035)
Personal Services 0.0428 0.0561 0.1401 0.1592
(0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0061)
Entertainment and recreation services 0.0519 0.0806 0.0135 0.0097
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0016)
Professional and related services 0.1019 0.1070 0.2454 0.2322
(0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0070)
Public Administration 0.0715 0.0793 0.0715 0.1205
(0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0054)
N 1,607 652 1,284 678
1 Data from pooled 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 cohorts of the NLSY, full time workers only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
44Table A6: Individual level characteristics, pooled NLSY data for private sector workers
Men Women
White Black White Black
HI 0.8744 0.7995 0.8501 0.8414
(0.0094) (0.0187) (0.0126) (0.0184)
Pension 0.7585 0.6688 0.7481 0.7698
(0.0122) (0.0219) (0.0154) (0.0213)
Both HI and Pension 0.7406 0.6535 0.7241 0.7416
(0.0125) (0.0222) (0.0158) (0.0221)
Education
Below High School 0.0236 0.0108 0.0176 0.0051
(0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0036)
Some High School 0.0864 0.1176 0.0680 0.0639
(0.0080) (0.0150) (0.0089) (0.0123)
High School 0.4453 0.5577 0.4811 0.4629
(0.0142) (0.0232) (0.0177) (0.0252)
Some College 0.1957 0.2026 0.2493 0.3503
(0.0113) (0.0187) (0.0153) (0.0241)
College Graduate and Above 0.2487 0.1111 0.1838 0.1176
(0.0123) (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0163)
Age 43 43 43 43
(0.0639) (0.1031) (0.0785) (0.1105)
Region
Northeast 0.1663 0.1263 0.1448 0.0946
(0.0106) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0148)
North Central 0.3058 0.1655 0.2871 0.1867
(0.0131) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.0197)
South 0.3213 0.6361 0.3790 0.6751
(0.0133) (0.0224) (0.0172) (0.0237)
West 0.2063 0.0718 0.1889 0.0434
(0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0103)
Child 1.3401 0.8779 1.1612 1.3375
(0.0366) (0.0559) (0.0382) (0.0569)
Spouse Wage 15178 8323 24087 11686
(741) (815) (1268) (1198)
Standardized AFQT score 0.2046 -0.7577 0.0094 -0.7250
(0.0284) (0.0339) (0.0317) (0.0342)
N 1,240 476 811 397
1 Data from pooled 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 cohorts of the NLSY, full time workers in the private
sector only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
45Table A7: Firm level characteristics, pooled NLSY data for private sector workers
Men Women
White Black White Black
Union Membership 0.1484 0.1655 0.0516 0.1125
(0.0101) (0.0173) (0.0078) (0.0160)
Firm Size 593 1621 676 1903
(94.5119) (488.711) (162.7418) (581.6746)
Occupation
Professional, Technical and Kindred 0.1190 0.0522 0.1246 0.1176
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0163)
Managers, Ocials and Proprietors 0.2055 0.0893 0.2292 0.1278
(0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0149) (0.0169)
Sales Workers 0.0946 0.0501 0.1234 0.0792
(0.0083) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0136)
Clerical and Kindred 0.0546 0.0675 0.2821 0.2404
(0.0064) (0.0117) (0.0159) (0.0216)
Craftsmen, Foremen and Kindred 0.3564 0.3790 0.1045 0.1662
(0.0136) (0.0226) (0.0108) (0.0188)
Operatives and Kindred 0.1101 0.2156 0.0251 0.0281
(0.0089) (0.0192) (0.0055) (0.0083)
Farm Laborers and Foreman 0.0114 0.0043 0 0
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0) (0)
Service Workers, except Private HH 0.0481 0.1416 0.1108 0.2404
(0.0061) (0.0162) (0.0111) (0.0216)
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 0.0163 0.0021 0.0037 0
(0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0)
Mining 0.0097 0.0043 0.0012 0
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0012) (0)
Construction 0.1427 0.1067 0.0277 0.0127
(0.0099) (0.0144) (0.0058) (0.0056)
Manufacturing 0.2805 0.2549 0.1750 0.1841
(0.0128) (0.0203) (0.0134) (0.0196)
Transportation, Communication, Public Utilities 0.1223 0.1241 0.0818 0.0920
(0.0093) (0.0154) (0.0097) (0.0146)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.1761 0.1742 0.1863 0.1381
(0.0108) (0.0177) (0.0138) (0.0174)
Finance, Insurance and Real estate 0.0628 0.0239 0.1372 0.1176
(0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0122) (0.0163)
Business and repair services 0.0309 0.0457 0.0125 0.0153
(0.0049) (0.0097) (0.0039) (0.0062)
Personal Services 0.0318 0.0457 0.1700 0.2429
(0.0050) (0.0097) (0.0133) (0.0217)
Entertainment and recreation services 0.0293 0.0893 0.0856 0.1099
(0.0048) (0.0133) (0.0099) (0.0158)
Professional and related services 0.0962 0.1263 0.1158 0.0869
(0.0084) (0.0155) (0.0113) (0.0142)
Public administration 0.0008 0.0021 0.0025 0
(0.0008) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0)
N 1,240 476 811 397
1 Data from pooled 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 cohorts of the NLSY, full time workers in the private sector
only.
2 Standard error in parentheses.
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